Praxis and the Philosophy of Liberation

In this meeting we discussed the “Appendix: Philosophy and Praxis” from Enrique Dussel’s Philosophy of Liberation. Puja presented a brief overview of this section emphasizing the role of philosophy with ideology and praxis, the influence and relative determination of praxis in shaping a philosophical system, the role of the organic philosopher converting through critical thinking in a philosopher of liberation and Dussel’s use of Nicaragua as a geopolitical example of an affirmation of a political exteriority. The discussion started with the question of the relationship of nationalism in the example of Nicaragua as an exteriority. We asked: In what sense is Nicaragua an exteriority? What is been affirmed? Is exteriority part of dialectic? In what consist the liberation of Nicaragua? How the liberation of Nicaragua expresses a form of analectic affirmation? We asked if this liberation and affirmation was an expression of hope at the beginning of the Sardinista’s Revolution in Nicaragua at the end of the 70s, considering this appendix was an address given in the 1980. In this sense, we discuss the geopolitics of the relationship of Nicaragua and the US, and whether is in this context that one can read a relationship of the new revolutionary movement as a form of political exteriority. Part of the struggle of discussing this section is to understand the relationship between totality and exteriority, and in what degree Dussel differs from Levinas philosophy of alterity.

 

The discussion moved to question Dussel category of utopia, its role, meaning and potential danger of falling in the future in reinstituting a new system of domination of one group over another. Besides the question and the critique, we also attempted to understand the relationship of utopia with Dussel’s Proyecto and praxis. In this sense, utopia can be understood as a necessary moment of affirmation that opens the possibility of working towards a proyecto.

 

One question that arise in the discussion was whether Dussel’s conceptualization of totality is encompassing and universal, or whether one can read Dussel’s metaphysical system as composed of different systems of totality. Is Dussel’s conceptualization of totality undermining the existence of multiple systems of oppressions and their intersections? There is space, however, to interpret Dussel as opening the possibility of a more intersectional analysis of systems of oppression as seen in page 188 when he asserts: “The oppressed are considered historically and socially as a class, geopolitically as a nation, sexually as repressed by macho ideology and practices, pedagogically as alienated and completely enclosed by an idolatrous fetishism.”

 

We close the discussion with questions about the relationship of the organic intellectual with the oppressed, and specifically we questioned Dussel’s claim that an organic intellectual, once converted to the liberation of the oppressed assumes their class. The discussion stem from this passage: “To be ‘organic’ (arrow e) with the historical subject means to resolutely acquire a class position with an oppressed people; it means to become involved in and form part of the popular movement of the working class or of marginal groups […]” (p.190) We questioned: In what sense Dussel means that the organic philosopher assumes the class of the oppressed? Is it in a Marxist sense? Does this requires to give up privileges and what type of commitment, risk and sacrifices this entails? Additionally, we questioned and discussed the relationship of the intellectual with communities and social movements. Does being an organic intellectual means the philosopher needs to belong or be in a committed relationship with the oppressed?

Defining Dialectics and Analectical Moments

    On January 19th, we discussed "Chapter 5: From Science to the Philosophy of Liberation" in Enrique Dussel's The Philosophy of Liberation. Our conversation began with a focus on section "5.3: The Analectical Moment" and how this concept was similar to or different from a dialectical method. We considered the extent to which the analectical moment exceeds dialectical thought and consequently provided a meta-lens through which to examine totality and its exteriority. In doing so, we discussed whether the analectical moment was an affirmation of exteriority in its negation of the negation of the system. 

   This led us to a discussion of the following questions: Why does Dussel frame the analectical moment as a moment and not as a method? To what extent does Dussel seek to distinguish himself from a dialectical method? This conversation about method versus moment drew us back to topics we discussed the previous week about ontology and metaphysics. We discussed how the analectical moment is a kind of metaphysics that goes beyond what is, and that beyond indicates the exteriority through which Dussel establishes a firm commitment to the Other. In contrast to Emmanuel Levinas's universal Other, Dussel sees the Other as particular and as the oppressed against whom the totality defines itself. Members pointed out that the analectical moment disappears in Dussel's later work, to be replaced in part by his concept of transmodernity. This move away from dialectics is in keeping with Adorno and a rejection of a dialectics as a dominant form of thought. 

    We then discussed how Dussel's exteriority defines difference, leading us to the following questions: How does Dussel address difference within the category of the oppressed? Does the negation of the negation actually affirm? Is there an erasure of difference in the project of liberation? How do you navigate competing demands without establishing a hierarchy of oppression? How do we conceptualize a heterogeneous exteriority? While Dussel has a marked interest in colonized cultures, he does not talk about differences within that group, for instance, of sexuality, gender, ethnicity, or race. Members noted that Dussel is distancing himself from Hegel, who drew on dialectics to affirm totality. Dussel wants to recognize something outside that totality. Others in the group noted that this use of universalizing categories is in keeping with contemporary theories that were emerging, for example, in world-systems theory. We also briefly discussed the concept of proyecto in the text, which indicates both a project and the idea of thrownness associated with Heidegger. The idea of thrownness in Heidegger, members pointed out, indicates a grasping or a grappling that is distinct from and pauses teleology. 

    While many questions were left unanswered, the points we raised through our discussion gives us a solid foundation through which to further examine Dussel's intervention as we read some of his later work next week before moving on to Spivak. We considered, for instance, how Dussel's grounding in European philosophy contrasts with that of Édouard Glissant. The idea of history as a totality in European philosophical traditions raise questions about the extent to which we can think about exteriority. Does this ultimately become a project of listening to the absences and silences or the mechanisms of silencing? Or are there other ways of thinking through which we might be able to account for difference in a philosophy of liberation?

The face of the Other in the Philosophy of Liberation

 In this meeting we began our discussion of the book Philosophy of Liberation by Enrique Dussel. Our discussion was focused on Chapter 2 “From Phenomenology to Liberation” and was led by Ricardo. Ricardo introduced Enrique Dussel’s intellectual development and the context in which this book was written. The first question that opened the discussion was about the relationship of Dussel with other thinkers such as Foucault in his writing of history. Part of the discussion to this question expanded to see the centrality of the question of history for 20th century philosophers, while signaling the differences in their question and understanding of history. For example, in the case of Heidegger the concern was more about the question of history in philosophy and how it has been addressed from a metaphysical perspective. Levinas critique Heidegger’s critique of a metaphysic of history because it leaves out a concern for the Other. Foucault could be situated as part of a critique and questioning of history after WWII. In Latin America, the question of history in the 60s was part of the concern for process of national liberation. 

The conversation continued with a question about the influence of theological thought and Christianity in Dussel conceptualization of the Other and the responsibility that one has with the Other. There are moments in the text when Dussel describe the responsibility to serve the Other and help liberate the oppressed that is reminiscent of Christianity. This led to a question about Dussel’s phenomenology. It seems that to be able to understand the relationship with the Other is important to question what is Dussel’s understanding of the subject, the “I” , and its relationship with the Other. Moreover, how is Dussel conceptualization of the subject in the world and its interpretation of it? Here we questioned Dussel’s explanation of the process by which we become subjects. This opened a discussion of Dussel’s explanation of the face-to-face encounter as having primacy before the creation of the subject, the understanding of being or other forms of understanding of the world. Zeinab questioned the emphasis of Dussel in love. Is the emphasis of love based in a theological foundation? Can this be antithetical to a project of liberation? We tried to understand where does love arises in a process of liberation. Is love the product of liberation or is it a given prior to liberation? How this emphasis of love can be contrasted with someone like Fanon that can be read as positing a form of ethical reciprocity after liberation? 

Part of the issue for Dussel is the problem with Western ontology, which is an ontology of Being, of domination. This ontology arranges the world into Being and Non-Beings. Dussel seems to propose instead a metaphysics that open oneself to the Other. For Levinas, at the very origin, we encounter the face of the Other. The face of the Other can be consider a priori in the sense that it conditions everything else. We encounter the face of the Other prior to making claims about Being or being able to make any epistemological claim. The possibility for love can be understood in this a priori encounter with the face of the Other. This led to questions about how is it that someone appears in proximity to me? How have we come to see the Other? What allows the Other to be revealed to me? Is it because of the system or is it something more existential? When you encounter the Other, what change is produced? What is mobilized? Is it a form of solidarity? Is it support? What opens the possibility of seeing the Other? Does it require a form of sensibility, a particular ethos? 

Part of what Dussel is doing in this chapter is providing a phenomenology to understand and interpret the experience when we encounter the Other. Seeing the face of the Other requires a form of interpretation and making sense of the world and ourselves.  The revelation of the Other, the exteriority of the system, can emerge in moments of fissures, ruptures, contradictions, and things that does not make sense. There are epiphanies in experiences that requires a work of interpretation. Therefore, for Dussel is important to develop a form of pedagogy that opens the possibility of seeing and have a responsibility for the other that has been pushed to the exteriority, what he calls the oppressed.  

One difficulty that can be posed to this philosophy of liberation is how difficult it is for most people to go against habits of thinking that developed through dominant process of socialization that prevent developing an ethics of liberation. It is more difficult for most people to have an epiphany. What are the conditions for the possibility of an epiphany? The challenge is in the process of interpretation and comprehension. Dussel acknowledge this difficulty in the section about interpretation and comprehension of the world when he recognizes the role of our preconception in the process of interpretation of things. The problem arises when one does not have the critical categories to make sense of things. This issue is made more complex in the section of alienation where Dussel analyze how the systems of domination maintains itself through repression. Dussel’s investment seems to be again in a pedagogy that begins with the interpretation of experience, but that is committed to make structural changes at different levels, including the economic.