The face of the Other in the Philosophy of Liberation

 In this meeting we began our discussion of the book Philosophy of Liberation by Enrique Dussel. Our discussion was focused on Chapter 2 “From Phenomenology to Liberation” and was led by Ricardo. Ricardo introduced Enrique Dussel’s intellectual development and the context in which this book was written. The first question that opened the discussion was about the relationship of Dussel with other thinkers such as Foucault in his writing of history. Part of the discussion to this question expanded to see the centrality of the question of history for 20th century philosophers, while signaling the differences in their question and understanding of history. For example, in the case of Heidegger the concern was more about the question of history in philosophy and how it has been addressed from a metaphysical perspective. Levinas critique Heidegger’s critique of a metaphysic of history because it leaves out a concern for the Other. Foucault could be situated as part of a critique and questioning of history after WWII. In Latin America, the question of history in the 60s was part of the concern for process of national liberation. 

The conversation continued with a question about the influence of theological thought and Christianity in Dussel conceptualization of the Other and the responsibility that one has with the Other. There are moments in the text when Dussel describe the responsibility to serve the Other and help liberate the oppressed that is reminiscent of Christianity. This led to a question about Dussel’s phenomenology. It seems that to be able to understand the relationship with the Other is important to question what is Dussel’s understanding of the subject, the “I” , and its relationship with the Other. Moreover, how is Dussel conceptualization of the subject in the world and its interpretation of it? Here we questioned Dussel’s explanation of the process by which we become subjects. This opened a discussion of Dussel’s explanation of the face-to-face encounter as having primacy before the creation of the subject, the understanding of being or other forms of understanding of the world. Zeinab questioned the emphasis of Dussel in love. Is the emphasis of love based in a theological foundation? Can this be antithetical to a project of liberation? We tried to understand where does love arises in a process of liberation. Is love the product of liberation or is it a given prior to liberation? How this emphasis of love can be contrasted with someone like Fanon that can be read as positing a form of ethical reciprocity after liberation? 

Part of the issue for Dussel is the problem with Western ontology, which is an ontology of Being, of domination. This ontology arranges the world into Being and Non-Beings. Dussel seems to propose instead a metaphysics that open oneself to the Other. For Levinas, at the very origin, we encounter the face of the Other. The face of the Other can be consider a priori in the sense that it conditions everything else. We encounter the face of the Other prior to making claims about Being or being able to make any epistemological claim. The possibility for love can be understood in this a priori encounter with the face of the Other. This led to questions about how is it that someone appears in proximity to me? How have we come to see the Other? What allows the Other to be revealed to me? Is it because of the system or is it something more existential? When you encounter the Other, what change is produced? What is mobilized? Is it a form of solidarity? Is it support? What opens the possibility of seeing the Other? Does it require a form of sensibility, a particular ethos? 

Part of what Dussel is doing in this chapter is providing a phenomenology to understand and interpret the experience when we encounter the Other. Seeing the face of the Other requires a form of interpretation and making sense of the world and ourselves.  The revelation of the Other, the exteriority of the system, can emerge in moments of fissures, ruptures, contradictions, and things that does not make sense. There are epiphanies in experiences that requires a work of interpretation. Therefore, for Dussel is important to develop a form of pedagogy that opens the possibility of seeing and have a responsibility for the other that has been pushed to the exteriority, what he calls the oppressed.  

One difficulty that can be posed to this philosophy of liberation is how difficult it is for most people to go against habits of thinking that developed through dominant process of socialization that prevent developing an ethics of liberation. It is more difficult for most people to have an epiphany. What are the conditions for the possibility of an epiphany? The challenge is in the process of interpretation and comprehension. Dussel acknowledge this difficulty in the section about interpretation and comprehension of the world when he recognizes the role of our preconception in the process of interpretation of things. The problem arises when one does not have the critical categories to make sense of things. This issue is made more complex in the section of alienation where Dussel analyze how the systems of domination maintains itself through repression. Dussel’s investment seems to be again in a pedagogy that begins with the interpretation of experience, but that is committed to make structural changes at different levels, including the economic.